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Behavioral Public Choice, U.S. National
Security Interests, and Transnational
Security Decision Making
DAVID

G. DELANEY*

ABSTRACT

Transnationallaw both shapes and is shaped by policy decisions of
public officials addressing global terrorist threats. These and other
interrelated security and human rights concerns challenge executive
officials in national governments and international organizations to
simultaneously advance the rule of law and pursue other important
welfare interests. This Article explores opportunities for transnational
executives to improve their work and transnationallegal frameworks. It
proposes that behavioralinsights into decision making and public policy
making provide essential lessons for those efforts. The U.S. experience
developing new policies to interrogate suspected terrorists following the
Al Qaeda attacks of September 2001 provides a historicalreference point
to consider specific opportunities to improve transnational security
decision making and transnationallaw.
INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the CIA and Department of Defense sought approval from
senior officials in President George Bush and Vice President Richard
Cheney's administration to interrogate known or suspected terrorists
using coercive physical and psychological techniques that were then
prohibited under international law, U.S. law, or U.S. policy. The CIA
request arose during the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a top Al Qaeda
planner. The military request came from those questioning Mohammad
al-Qahtani-the suspected twentieth hijacker in Al Qaeda's September
2001 attacks against the United States-who was being held at the U.S.
military base at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba. Internal CIA and Defense
Department reviews ultimately led officials to coordinate with the
Department of Justice, the White House, and other government entities.
Based on legal, medical, and other expert advice, President Bush, Vice
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President Cheney, and other senior officials approved new policies that
many national and international communities regarded as ineffective,
unlawful, immoral, and otherwise detrimental to national and global
welfare.
This Article considers these decisions in the context of global
counterterrorism policies and human rights concerns, and explores the
diverse ways executive power both shapes and is shaped by
globalization. The term "transnational law of torture" is used to refer to
the body of international law and national laws that regulate the use of
torture and other coercive acts by public officials. "Transnational
executives" are those performing executive government functions
relative to this body of law in national governments or
intergovernmental organizations. The Article focuses on U.S.
transnational executives-the president, vice president, and other
executive branch officials-and the decision processes they used.
Behavioral public choice theory provides the lens to consider how
U.S. officials assessed the legal, moral, and other welfare interests
embodied in the transnational law of torture. The behavioral component
of this emerging field applies the lessons of cognitive science and
psychology to consider how biases, heuristics, and other factors affect
decisions of public officials.' That discussion is facilitated by the
common heuristic describing the different experiential and analytical
modes of thinking as System 1 (automatic, quick, effortless,
involuntary) and System 2 (effortful, deliberate, and "often associated
with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration"). 2
The public choice component is rooted in economic analysis of public
policy making. The focus is on welfare considerations, incentives of
public officials and interest groups, and constitutional and other
institutional factors that shape policy outcomes.
Behavioral public choice accounts of national security policy and
transnational security issues are few. Daniel Sokol has observed that

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am
grateful to my fellow Transnational Executive Symposium participants and members of
Indiana University's Ostrom Workshop for feedback on early versions of this Article. I am
also indebted to Paul Slovic and Gene Coyle for their thoughtful comments on this work
and their interest in bridging academic and professional communities to seek solutions to
challenging social problems.
1. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM,

100 (2014); see also W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The
Behavioral Paradox of Government Policy (Vanderbilt Univ. Law and Econ. Working
Paper No. 15-2, 2015), httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract-2559408.
2. See, e.g., Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in
Reasoning: Implications for the RationalityDebate?, 23 BEHAV. AND BRAIN SCI. 645 (2000);
see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, 19-30 (2011).
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greater attention is needed on human rights, the complex factors that
operate across multiple levels of international decision making, and
institutional design. 3 Numerous scholars have critiqued the methods
that U.S. security agencies use to determine cost values and assess risk
to mitigate terrorism and other security concerns. Notwithstanding the
challenges of assessing both terrorism risk and the soundness of related
security decisions, Cass Sunstein 4 and W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer5
anticipate opportunities to develop the behavioral public choice field to
improve national security policy decisions.
This Article proceeds with those goals in mind to demonstrate how
the field can advance the study of transnational issues by assessing U.S.
national security decision-making processes. Part I provides an
overview of the transnational law of torture that applied to the CIA and
Defense Department decisions. It also summarizes key moments in
those decision timelines. Part II draws on behavioral and public choice
literatures to identify behavioral failures that can contribute to
suboptimal U.S. national security decisions. Part III suggests a number
of opportunities to improve U.S. decision-making processes and
transnational law. With a focus on the role of the lawyer in
transnational security decisions, Part III is based on recommendations
by Paul Slovic 6 and Cass Sunstein to improve decision-making
environments.7

I. TRANSNATIONAL TORTURE LAW AND POLICY
Morality and law are inseparable, and the relationship between
them has never been more broadly and closely scrutinized than
following the global security crises of the past century.8 Transnational
public law formed during that period stems from those global events. It
codifies lines between lawful and unlawful behavior for courts to
adjudicate. It also embodies moral principles of the drafting
3. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1040-1048 (2011) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) and discussing the
importance of public choice analysis of international legal issues).
4. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 31.
5. See Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 1, at 25-26.
6. Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).

7. Cass R. Sunstein, If Misfearing is the Problem, is Cost-Benefit Analysis the
Solution?, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 231 (Eldar Shafir ed.,
2013).
8. See, e.g., JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY

(2012).
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communities that reflect their collective lived experiences and
aspirations for future societies.
The legal and moral objectives of the transnational law of torture
present tangible and intangible welfare interests for political
communities to define and advance. Faithful execution of the law urges
respect for both categories, which include reductions in human suffering
and retributive forms of justice, as well as increases in government
accountability, effectiveness, and legitimacy. International treaties and
federal laws speak to these interests and guide U.S. officials when
physical and psychological coercion arise as policy interests to
accomplish law enforcement, military, intelligence, or other public
functions. This Part summarizes that body of law and key decisions of
the Bush-Cheney administration that created a new global
counterterrorism program involving at least sixty-nine nations to detain
and interrogate terrorist suspects.9
A. Internationaland U.S. Law
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 articulate clear legal and moral imperatives for humane
treatment of combatants and noncombatants during armed conflict.' 0
For the last half-century, transnational executives have sought to
promote humane conduct by public officials in a wider variety of
circumstances. What begins with the 1945 United Nations Charter as a
general statement of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms" evolves rapidly into more specific legal definitions and
obligations.
The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drafted within
three years of the formation of the United Nations, expressly states the
policy and moral objective: "No one shall be subject to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 12 By 1966, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights codifies these
9. See Rebecca Cordell, The U.S. Carried Out ExtraordinaryRendition Flights from
2001-2005. Here Are 15 More Countries That Helped, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/14/the-u-s-carried-outextraordinary-rendition-flights-from-2001-2005-here-are-15-more-countries-thathelped/?utmterm=.5e2fe7fb2ca8.
10. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 3-4, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague II]; Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land arts. 3-4, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3, 13, 20, Aug. 12, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3316.
11. U.N. Charter art. 55, 1 1.
12. G.A Res. 217 (1I1) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 10,
1948).
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terms in international law. 13 With the 1984 U.N. Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) the legal obligations for public officials become more
explicit. 14 The prohibition against torture-now defined as intentional
infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering-is nonderogable: "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
5
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."'
Nations incur responsibility to prevent, investigate, and adjudicate
incidents as violations of national law, not just international law. The
prohibition applies to any law enforcement, military, civil, medical, or
other public official "who may be involved in the custody, interrogation
or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention
6
or imprisonment."1
The CAT also requires nations to "undertake to prevent in any
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
7
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture."1 To
accomplish this broad prevention goal, all public officials involved in
custody, interrogation, or treatment must receive education,
information, and training on torture and these other acts.18 Nations
must also review rules, instructions, methods, and practices on a
regular basis to prevent torture and other acts.' 9
This common treatment of torture and other acts underscores the
CAT's undifferentiated moral condemnation of state-sponsored human
suffering, notwithstanding the legal distinction that emerged between
severe harm and other forms of treatment or punishment. More
practically, the education, review, and other administrative steps
required to implement the CAT are evidence of the drafters'
expectations that institutional design is an essential element of
achieving the law's broad welfare interests. The starting point within
states party to the CAT is expected to be a common base of knowledge
and training from which public officials can develop policy options to
address a wide variety of complex transnational security and human
rights issues.
13. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
14. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter United Nations Convention
against Torture].
15. Id. art. 2, 1 2.
16. Id. art. 10, 1 1.
17. Id. art. 16, 1 1.
18. Id. arts. 10, 1 1, 16, 1 1.
19. Id. arts. 11, 16, T 1.
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The CAT and Geneva Conventions are not self-executing in many
nations, including the United States. The 1994 Federal Torture Act 20
implements the CAT by specifically prohibiting acts inflicting "severe
physical or mental pain and suffering (other than pain and suffering
incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person." 21 The War Crimes
Act of 1996 penalizes certain violations of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, Common Article 3 of those conventions, and the Hague
Convention of 1907 with sentences ranging from fines and
imprisonment to death. 22 "Torture" and "cruel or inhuman treatment" as
defined in Common Article 3 are among the war crimes Congress
included in this law. 23

Jeannine Bell's conceptual framing of torture on one end of a
continuum brings important analytical clarity and mental framing to
the way international and national elements of transnational torture
law can be shaped. 24 She describes as "classic torture" those acts that
inflict severe, lasting harm in violation of the CAT and Geneva
Conventions. 25 In her view, international treaties also prohibit or
significantly constrain two other groups of practices forming the middle
ranges of the continuum. The first group is cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment; she describes the second as
"torture lite."26 Only the least intrusive end of the spectrumpsychologically coercive interrogation practices-is not regulated by
international law. In the United States this activity includes traditional
interrogation techniques employed by law enforcement officials that are
regulated by federal and state law. It is the CAT, however, that now
requires public officials to be educated and trained on the entire
continuum of harmful investigative techniques and the opportunity to
face criminal sanction under international and U.S. law if they move up
the continuum. 27 This example demonstrates how international and
national law must be understood and implemented as a collective whole,
not only to discern clear legal requirements, but also to identify
opportunities to shape executive action toward greater welfare
outcomes.
20. Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506 (Apr. 30, 1994), 108 Stat. 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
2340A-2340B (2012)).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2012).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012).
23. Id. § 2441(d)(1)(A), (B).
24. Jeannine Bell, "Behind This Mortal Bone'" The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND.
L. J. 339, 346 (2008).
25. Id. at 343-44
26. Id.
27. United Nations Convention against Torture, supra note 14, art. 10; see infra Part
II.B.3.
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When confronted with security threats, law enforcement,
intelligence, military, or policy officials may find it challenging to
inventory and quantify more specifically the many direct and indirect
welfare interests advanced by this body of law. Yet that kind of parsing
and assessment is an unavoidable System 1 process in individuals and
groups. In extreme cases there may be little opportunity for System 2
processing that brings more formal weighing of trade-offs among
interests, outcomes, and values.
Specifying the circumstances of the threat directs the transnational
executive's mind to a host of reference points that may shape System 1
and 2 determinations: money is never a reason to inflict even mild
psychological harm, let alone extreme physical harm; some crimes
require public officials to push the legal and moral limits; it is never
acceptable to violate a citizen's constitutional liberty interests, but there
should be different rules for others; or society needs public officials to
inflict some degree of physical or psychological harm to prevent a
terrorist from injuring or killing people in my country. Culture, politics,
and other social factors are clearly at work in this array of judgments
that senior or junior officials may make as they shape policy. Fear and
other emotions also play outsize roles in the public official's actions. If
transnational torture law is to be implemented to maximize legal,
moral, and other welfare interests, then its international and national
components must guide executives toward mechanisms that help them
avoid lesser outcomes.
B. New U.S. Torture Policiesfor the Global War on Terror
The remainder of this Part provides an overview of the decisionmaking environments as a wide range of executive officials shaped new
torture policies for the CIA and Defense Department. One of the first
clear policy directives to follow the September 11 attacks was President
Bush's September 12, 2001 charge to the nation's senior law
enforcement official, Attorney General John Ashcroft, to ensure such an
attack would never happen again. 28 While general in nature, the
imperative conveys the gravity of the President's concern and urges
preventive law enforcement and, arguably, a "do whatever it takes"
mindset. That same week Vice President Cheney set the tone for public
debate by asserting during a televised interview that government would
"use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective." 29

28. SEE JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE

BUSH ADMINISTRATION 74-75 (2007).
29. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 14, 2001).
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That frame of reference was conveyed to public officials in many ways,
including Cheney's November 2001 statement to CIA officials that "lowprobability threats must be treated like a certainty."3 0
By February 2002, this posture was reflected in President Bush's
decision to accept the recommendation of Justice Department, State
Department, Defense Department, and White House lawyers that the
Geneva Conventions did not protect Al Qaeda or other terrorist actors
captured by U.S. officials because they were not "combatants" as defined
in those agreements.3 1 The President decided not to extend the
protections of the Conventions to detainees as a matter of policy, and he
accepted a recommendation that his constitutional role as commander
in chief permitted him to disregard the CAT.32
1. Creatinga CIA InterrogationPolicy
The CIA's interest in changing U.S. torture policy reportedly began
in March 2002 with the capture and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a
top Al Qaeda operative who had been found in Pakistan. 33 According to
CIA acting General Counsel John Rizzo, CIA counterterrorism,
interrogation, psychology, and other experts developed the "enhanced
interrogation program" to break Zubaydah's resistance and elicit
information about threats

to U.S.

interests.

34

Within weeks,

CIA

lawyers and officials from the Counterterrorist Center presented the
proposal to Rizzo, who briefed Director Tenet and sought discussions
with John Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council
(NSC).35 Within ten days Rizzo had briefed Bellinger, several Justice
Department attorneys, and FBI Director Robert Mueller on the CIA's
policy interest.3 6 Rizzo also requested a legal memorandum describing
the limits of CIA authority specifically under the Federal Torture Act.
In July the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
delivered a draft legal memorandum to Rizzo and the NSC and Justice
Department attorneys for review and input. 37 By then Director Mueller
had decided, as a matter of policy, not to allow FBI employees to
30. GOLDSMITH, supra note 28, at 75 (citing RON SusKIND, THE ONE PERCENT
DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11 (2006)).
31. ID. AT 39-40; CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 146-47 (2007).
32. SEE SAVAGE, supra note 31, at 154-55.
33. See id. at 154, 219; SEE ALSO JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN: THIRTY YEARS OF
CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 3 (2014).

34.
35.
36.
37.

RIZZO, supra note 33, at 183, 187, 189.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 191.
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participate in interrogations involving the enhanced techniques because
they violated U.S. legal and policy standards for criminal
Department finalized the legal
investigations. 38 The Justice
memorandum 39 August 1, 2002, after briefings to Vice President Cheney
and National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice. 40 Rizzo and Tenet
dispute President Bush's claim that he was aware of and approved the
policy. 41 The CIA began to implement the new policy upon receipt of the
memorandum. 42
2. The 2002 Defense Department Policy
The military's interest in changing U.S. torture policy reportedly
began in October 2002.43 Interrogators at the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantdnamo Bay sought permission to use more severe tactics on
Mohammad al-Qahtani. He had been captured in Afghanistan ten
months earlier and was believed to be a 9/11 hijacker who was denied
entry to the United States via the Orlando International Airport in
August 2001. The legal advisor to the interrogation team, Lieutenant
Colonel Diane Beaver, wrote a legal opinion concluding that harsher
techniques were permissible based on the president's earlier decisions
not to afford Geneva Convention protections to suspected terrorists.44
In December 2002 Defense Department General Counsel Jim
Haynes advised Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to approve all requested
techniques except waterboarding and mock executions, which Haynes
viewed as "not warranted." 45 Secretary Rumsfeld accepted the
recommendation and approved the new policy based on this internal
Defense Department advice. Later that month Navy General Counsel
Alberto Mora learned of the new policy from Navy psychologists and
investigators reviewing interrogation logs. 46 He disagreed with Haynes's
legal advice and sought to have the policy rescinded. In January 2003 he
presented Haynes with a draft memorandum expressing his legal
determinations and recommendations. He threatened to finalize the
memorandum to create a permanent record of his views that afternoon

38. Id.
39. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the Cent. Intelligence
Agency, "Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative" (Op. O.L.C., Aug. 1, 2002).
40. RIZZO, supra note 33, at 196.
41. Id. at 197-99.
42. Id. at 193.
43. SAVAGE, supra note 31, at 177-78.
44. Id. at 178.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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if the policy remained in place. 47 Haynes reported that Secretary
Rumsfeld was already planning to rescind his decision to allow a new
working group to review various Guantinamo prisoner policies.
3. The 2003 Defense DepartmentPolicy
To inform the group's work, Haynes asked OLC for a memorandum
"that would settle how far military interrogators legally could go
inflicting suffering on detainees."4 8 Mora and other senior military
attorneys objected to Assistant Attorney General John Yoo's draft
opinion, which was based on the analysis and advice delivered to the
CIA in August. 49 Concerns that Mora and other Defense Department
attorneys expressed to OLC were not addressed in the final
memorandum, and Yoo advised Mora that his only recourse was to
advance his legal and other arguments through Defense Department
policy discussions; the memorandum was delivered to the working group
on
Guantinamo
policies
and,
ultimately,
the Guantinamo
commander.50
II. A BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE ON TORTURE LAW AND
POLICY

The public choice field considers the interests and influences that
shape public officials' actions to explain government policies. Adding a
behavioral component to the analysis provides the opportunity to
consider how biases, heuristics, and other cognitive shortcuts in
individual and group decision making contribute to public policy. This
Part draws on the 2002-2003 U.S. torture decisions to suggest how
behavioral failures can contribute to suboptimal policies.
A. HistoricalContext
While different in many ways, catastrophic security events like Al
Qaeda's 9/11 attacks or Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
instill public fear, motivate protective policy interests, and present
executive officials with short decision timelines. These points of
similarity require deeper consideration as relationships among
behavioral failures, transnational security decisions, and legal

47. Id. at 179.
48. Id.
49. See id.; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 28, at 150-54.
50. SAVAGE, supra note 31, at 180.
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frameworks are explored. System 1 responses may include fight-orflight choices like the decision Vice President Cheney and President
Bush faced as United Airlines flight ninety-three flew toward
Washington. When the vice president learned of the flight path he
authorized military forces to shoot down the aircraft; he subsequently
reported flight ninety-three's path to the president, who made the same
decision. 5 1 While a shoot-down proved unnecessary, the Constitution
and international law provide a firm legal foundation for such protective
responses to sudden, ongoing attacks. The law may be viewed as
according with System 1 preservation instincts and some range of moral
and welfare interests, at least when elected executives believe they are
confronting existential threats to a head of state or system of
government. However, in an age of smaller-scale threats and greater
security cooperation among nations, national and global communities
may find it more appropriate to circumscribe executive officials'
prerogative differently.
More complex, deliberate policy decisions taken over longer periods
of time are more common for elected executives and other executive
branch officials, but the mere opportunity for such System 2
deliberation does not prevent behavioral failures that can lead to poor
balancing of security risks and human rights interests. President
Roosevelt's 1942 directive authorizing the secretary of war and other
52
military officials to intern Americans and others is one example. The
president's order made no reference to citizenship, ancestry, geographic
origin, religion, or other personal characteristics. But it enabled military
officials to issue orders depriving individuals of Japanese, Italian,
German, and Jewish descent or origin of their liberty. The behavioral
public choice question is why Roosevelt chose this policy when FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General Francis Biddle advised
him on intelligence, legal, and civil liberties grounds against it.53
Whatever similar behavioral failures Roosevelt and Bush-Cheney
administration officials may have exhibited throughout World War II
and the Global War on Terror, they drew on very different transnational
legal frameworks to guide their policy choices. As summarized in Part I,
51. ID. at 4-5.
52. See Exec. Order No. 9,066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (1942).
53. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 28, at 44-48. See DAVID D. LOMAN, MAGIC: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE RESIDENTS

FROM THE WEST COAST DURING WWII 77 (2001), for the assertion that "[niot a single
person who had access to the full story of [a highly classified military collection program
codenamed] MAGIC objected to mass evacuation of Japanese residents." Rather than
answering the important behavioral public choice question, this assertion focuses the
inquiry on presidential decision making and the work of small groups of other public
officials possessing the classified information.
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much of the current law regulating war, intelligence, and law
enforcement practices emanated from the World War II and Cold War
experience. If there has been some discernable advance in the rule of
law, it may be for the field of behavioral public choice to show how
executive officials overcome specific decision-making failures to achieve
greater welfare outcomes for national and international communities
than they would otherwise achieve.

B. The Behavioral U.S. National Security Environment
This section draws on foundational behavioral public choice
scholarship to identify opportunities to extend the field to U.S.
transnational security policy. Regarding government policy generally,
Viscusi and Gayer observe that officials frequently misperceive risks,
are averse to risk ambiguity and losses, and make inconsistent tradeoffs
in policy decisions. 54 In many areas of government decision making they
emphasize problems assessing risk and dealing with risk ambiguity
when the risks are newly discovered.5 5
Similar behavior should be expected in the national security
arena.56 Exploring ways in which transnational executives depart from
decisions based on expected utility-and may have done so to
implement the 2002-2003 policies-provides a descriptive account of
important decision-making moments and processes that warrant closer
examination in laboratory and field settings. The objective is to suggest
how such boundedly rational U.S. national security decisions can be
understood and further studied. As in many other public policy fields,
such examination should be expected to reveal specific opportunities to
improve decisions shaped by errors in judgment, mental shortcuts, and
other phenomenon that lead to suboptimal welfare outcomes.
1. Errorsof Judgment
Behavioral understandings of individual and group decision making
identify many ways that suboptimal outcomes are reached. Biases,
heuristics, and other errors in judgment affect both System 1 and
System 2 processes.5 7 These errors must be understood in specific
settings to describe the bounded rationality of U.S. national security
54. Viscusi & Gayer, supranote 1, at 5.
55. Id. at 17-26.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, A Behavioral Economics Analysis of Employment Law, in
THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 264, 274-75 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
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decision-making environments. The following short discussion of biases
and heuristics suggests how errors in judgment may have shaped
actions involving CIA, Defense Department, White House, and other
public officials.
Availability bias is particularly relevant. Low-probability events
that are recent in one's memory or experience are weighted more
heavily than higher-probability events that are not.58 Between 2001 and
2003, availability bias would be expected to affect the American public,
not just national security executives. During that time there were
numerous terrorist attacks in Europe, and American public attention
was drawn to the investigative work of the 9/11 Commission and a
string of mailings of deadly (and in some cases innocuous) substances to
government officials and members of the media. A series of sniper
shootings in the Washington, D.C., suburbs also heightened concerns
about security and safety. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and
senior Pentagon officials who were attacked or thought to be targets on
September 11 may be particularly prone to availability bias in their
decisions.
Kahneman describes terrorism as effective because it "induces an
59
availability cascade" in which "System 1 cannot be turned off." The
fear that is generated and socialized by catastrophic attacks is a System
1 result that requires extraordinary effort and information to overcome.
The public at large may have limited ability to mitigate fear and the
availability cascade since they have little information about terrorist
threats and government counterterrorism programs. National security
communities will have better information on threats and risks, but
whether they are individually and collectively better able to mitigate
availability bias is an open question.
Single-action bias may also be evident in government responses to
crises. It is a reliance on just one response action when multiple actions
may be required or preferable.6 0 Following a security crisis, public
officials may gravitate toward a response action they control most easily
or that reassures the public or that appears most likely to deliver
immediate results. When U.S. officials captured two key suspects within
six months of 9/11, the bias may have focused the officials on developing
a detention-interrogation program to the exclusion of other welfareenhancing outcomes.
58. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974); see also Sunstein, supra note 7, at 232.
59. KAHNEMAN, supra note 2, at 322-23.
60. See Elke U. Weber, Doing the Right Thing Willingly: Using the Insights of
Behavioral Decision Research for Better Environmental Decisions, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBuc POLIcY 380, 383 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
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Transnational executives should also be concerned about selfserving bias. It can lead to decisions about legal and moral norms that
support or benefit personal, organizational, or institutional interests
while appearing wholly unjustified from other perspectives. As
conflicting policy, legal, or moral positions emerge between national
governments, among U.S. government agencies, or even within an
agency, transnational executives must be attuned to this bias and have
ready opportunities to resolve them. The president's constitutional role
fuses policy, legal, and moral authority that can help resolve
subordinate U.S. government conflicts. To effectively counter selfserving bias in agency-sponsored policy proposals, however, the
president, vice president, and White House officials must be looking for
opportunities to mitigate it. They must also be able to consider how the
bias shapes their own policy orientations and decision-making roles.
Present bias describes a focus on near-term issues when it may be
more beneficial to address future issues. It may contribute to decisions
to apply counterterrorism resources (and redirect other public
resources) to guard against near-term terrorist strikes even though
there is equal or less probability of such an attack. Officials may also
favor policies that provide immediate or near-term results: a detentioninterrogation program instead of a surveillance program; harsh
interrogation techniques instead of building rapport with detainees over
time; or pursuing military action instead of diplomatic engagement.
Posing short-term policy options directly against long-term options
presents opportunities to consider how fiscal, life-saving, rule-of-law,
humanitarian, and other welfare outcomes may vary. If the default
transnational security interest is understood to be "near-term security,
whatever it takes" then significant System 2 processes will be required
to overcome it.
The social aspect of transnational security decision making is
informed by considering conformity bias. As security executives
contemplate their roles proposing, reviewing, advising on, or deciding a
new interrogation policy, they look to others for cues on proper
behavior. 6 ' Senior officials who explicitly or implicitly set parameters for
new policies establish standards against which junior officials will
assess their contributions. Peers in a military unit or intelligence
agency expressing personal or organizational views may embolden those
with similar views and dissuade those with dissenting views.
Professionals subject to ethical codes of conduct must be particularly

61. See Robert Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be Their
Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 35, 43 (2015), http//scholarship.1aw.
nd.edulndlepp/vol29/isall21.
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cognizant of this bias since their objectivity and service to broader
public communities may suffer.
The bias blind spot-denying one's own biases while imputing bias
to others-is also a primary consideration for transnational executives
because it has been identified as a factor in cycles of violence and
retribution related to terrorism. 62 Transnational executives may impute
unfounded biases to terrorists' actions and be blind to the biases
shaping their own views of a conflict. The unintended result is that
intelligence, military, and other officials seeking to resolve conflict take
steps that promote further violence and other harms. Policy options
developed by one government may reflect national notions of retributive
justice when international law may require or urge forms of corrective,
distributive, or procedural justice. An important question for national
governments is thus whether their decision-making processes can
overcome this blind spot and promote policies that accord with broad
transnational objectives.
From a more bureaucratic perspective, the bias blind spot may also
undermine effective multiagency decision making. Officials from one
agency may impute biases to those in other agencies when policy
recommendations do not apply or strengthen one's own institution. At
the same time those officials may overlook the biases that lead them to
believe that their recommended course of action is most favorable. The
blind spot thus perpetuates any interagency conflict and prevents
officials working in different law enforcement, intelligence, defense, or
other specialty agencies from working toward mutual interests.
As these and other biases are understood better in U.S. national
security communities it is likely that systematic bias can also be
identified. Maxwell Stearns and Todd Zywicki identify systematic bias
as an outgrowth of the challenges of quantifying and assessing different
kinds of risk.63 They point to empirical studies of administrative
regulatory agencies showing that officials avoid short-term, tangible
harms even when long-term costs are equivalent. 64 The System 1 or
System 2 processes that lead those regulatory systems to that outcome
may be difficult to ascertain. But knowing that public officials are
62. See Emily Pronin & Kathleen Schmidt, Claims and Denials of Bias and Their
Implications for Policy, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 195, 195

(Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
63. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 358-61 (2009) (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III

(2003); Alberto Divila et al., ImmigrationReform, the INS, and the Distributionof Interior
and Border Enforcement Resources, 99 PUB. CHOICE 327 (1999); John R. Gist & R. Carter
Hill, The Economics of Choice in the Allocation of Federal Grants:An Empirical Test, 36
PUB. CHOICE 63 (1981)).
64. Id.
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inclined to certain policy choices provides an important reference point
for studying systematic transnational security bias.
2. Other Behavioral Considerations
There are many more (and more complex) behavioral dimensions of
national security decision making that warrant consideration than can
be explored here. Officials may have been averse to losing benefits from
reliable detainee information in comparison to greater benefits realized
on longer timeframes. The certainty effect-overweighting a lowprobability event because it has occurred-may be expected following a
catastrophe like 9/11, and it appears central to Vice President Cheney's
2001 guidance to CIA officers to treat low-probability threats as
certainties. Attribute substitution-answering an easy question as a
substitute for a more complex one-is a mechanism for heuristics to
operate6 5 and may explain officials' efforts to implement the president's
decisions regarding the CAT and Geneva Conventions to the fullest
extent instead of exploring transnational law's broader welfare interests
more fully. Officials may decide to implement protective, proactive
security programs like coercive interrogations that contradict their
professed value objectives due to the prominence effect.66 And
imperative policy pronouncements from the president, vice president,
and other senior officials may undermine efforts to develop courses of
action.6 7
Security policies that evolved over many months with input from
dozens or hundreds of officials should be expected to be shaped in
important ways by these or other behavioral influences. Anticipating
them and structuring day-to-day and crisis decision-making
environments to minimize or eliminate them holds promise for
improving the implementation of transnational law. But failures of
human decision making are not the only sources of suboptimal policies.

65. See Jolls, supranote 57, at 274-75.
66. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Iconic Photographs and the Ebb and Flow of Empathic
Response to HumanitarianDisasters, 114 PROC. NAVL ACAD. SCI. 640, 642 (2017) (arguing
that "the prominence effect may underlie what we see as a disconnect between expressed
and revealed values regarding whether or not to act to protect large numbers of civilian
lives under attack in foreign countries."); Paul Slovic, When (In)Action Speaks Louder than
Words: Confronting the Collapse of HumanitarianValues in ForeignPolicy Decisions, 1 U.
ILL. L. REv. SLIP OPINIONS 24, 28 (2015), http //www.illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2
015/04/Slovic.pdf (hypothesizing that "because of the prominence effect, lofty humanitarian
values are systematically devalued in the decision-making process.").
67. See MICHAEL J. MAZARR, RETHINKING RISK IN NATIONAL SECURITY: LESSONS OF
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 77-88 (2016).

TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING

445

3. Salience
Sunstein observes that "a lack of salience can be its own behavioral
market failure."68 Laws or regulations requiring that calorie counts
appear on restaurant menus or that nutritional information appear on
packaged food make that information salient to consumers. In these
examples, law's function is to enable decisions based on information
that is directly related to long-term welfare interests but otherwise
hidden from or unavailable to the decision maker. Improving salience
thus promotes many personal benefits, like better health and quality of
life, as well as public benefits like lower long-term public health
spending.
Article 10 of the CAT provides a very broad requirement for public
officials to be informed about torture and related issues:
Each State Party shall ensure that education and
information regarding the prohibition against torture
are fully included in the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public
officials and other persons who may be involved in the
custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or
imprisonment.6 9
This promotes awareness of the transnational law of torture and makes
international law a salient issue for many public officials working
directly with those in custody. But simple awareness of the law does not
generate specific benefits for individuals or the public at large. To solve
a salience problem the law must guide national-level executives to
specific information that helps them achieve the law's broader welfare
interests.
At one level, transnational torture law was highly salient to BushCheney administration officials. The CIA and Defense Department
identified the relevant law then began broad System 2 debates about its
meaning and application. Once they drew lines between lawful and
unlawful techniques they developed employee training materials and
expanded a global program to implement their decisions with other
nations' transnational executives. A deeper inquiry into salience would
consider whether decision makers possessed adequate information that

68. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 40.
69. United Nations Convention against Torture, supra note 14, art. 10.
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would help them decide in favor of broader, longer-term welfare
interests of the law itself.
The FBI's 2002 decision not to participate in the CIA interrogations
and the 2003 internal Defense Department dissent by political
appointees and career officials may be viewed as efforts to present such
salient information to senior officials. The FBI pointed to law, policy,
and organizational culture as reasons not to participate. The military
dissenters drafted memorandums on legal and policy issues. In both
circumstances senior decision makers did not closely examine the
detailed information FBI and Defense Department officials cited or
offered.
4. Judgments of Value
The foregoing discussion does not imply that behavioral failures are
the only explanation for policy decisions that do not maximize welfare.
Public officials should certainly place a high value on investigating and
stopping domestic or international attacks. The question is how to
accomplish those goals when the methods implicate other interests and
values.
In the domestic setting, the Constitution, Torture Statute, War
Crimes Act, and other elements of federal and state law collectively
prohibit law enforcement and other public officials from interrogating
criminal suspects with the techniques the CIA and Defense Department
proposed for detainees at Guantdnamo Bay and elsewhere outside the
United States. Those who contemplate using those techniques draw
upon a wealth of experience and information to make many System 1
and System 2 judgments. Even if a detective or senior police department
officials were to take no formal steps to assess the prospects of a new
interrogation policy, their legal, moral, and cultural references lead to
welfare assessments and value judgments that discourage torture or
other acts. In these circumstances, as with the FBI's 2002 decision, the
public official's decision not to torture is primarily a judgment of value
that is rooted in many constitutional rule-of-law considerations.
III. IMPROVING TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING
Two proposals to mitigate behavioral failures in public policy guide
the discussion in this Part. The first is Paul Slovic's framework to
address global inaction in the face of mass human suffering. The
concern he and his coauthors address is that public officials and the
public at large will be numbed by mass atrocities to the point of
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70
inhibiting military or other interventions to prevent or stop them. His
proposal has four main elements: (1) insulate institutions from the
effects of psychic numbing; (2) remove or restrict institutional features
that foster psychic numbing; (3) promote System 2 deliberation directly;
and (4) employ System 1 to channel actors toward System 2 processes.
The focus is on the behavioral dimension of public policy makingSystem 1 and System 2 processes of individuals, organizations, and
institutions that can be shaped to improve outcomes under
transnational law. This level of abstraction suggests that Slovic's
proposal can be applied in other areas where transnational security and
human rights issues overlap, even if psychic numbing is not the
behavioral phenomenon of concern.
The second guiding proposal is Cass Sunstein's argument for costbenefit analysis in risk-related administrative regulations "as a means
of responding to the general problem of misfearing, which arises when
71
people are afraid of trivial risks and neglectful of serious ones." Many
of his eight propositions can be viewed as specific ways to accomplish at
least one of Slovic's four steps. For example, the first three of Sunstein's
propositions all promote System 2 deliberation directly (Slovic's third
element): identify advantages or disadvantages of a course of action,
including a statement of the full range of beneficial effects; use
quantitative descriptions to supplement qualitative descriptions of
relevant effects; and attempt to convert nonmonetary values (e.g., lives
72
saved, health gains, aesthetic values) into dollar equivalents. These
three propositions echo Slovic's interest in institutional improvements
(first and second elements): law should set floors and ceilings for agency
valuations of life; agencies should publicly articulate valuation
adjustments and choices; agencies should be free to adjust valuations
based on qualitative factors; judicial review should require a general
showing that the regulation has produced more good than harm.
Slovic's framework to address global inaction in the face of mass
human suffering cannot, of course, be conflated with Sunstein's
argument for cost-benefit analysis in U.S. regulatory programs.
Nevertheless, the similar approaches they take to improving public
policy provide an important guidepost for future behavioral public
choice research. Drawing on Parts I and II, this Part identifies
opportunities for transnational communities to improve public policy
decisions involving security and human rights interests.

A. MitigatingBehavioral Failuresof Individuals
70. See Slovic et al., supra note 6, at 134-139.
71. Sunstein, supranote 7, at 239-40.
72. See id. at 239.
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Overcoming
behavioral failures is an organizational and
institutional undertaking, but it begins at the individual level. Officials
who are aware that availability bias, present bias, loss aversion, or
other behavioral failures can result in policy options that achieve only
modest welfare outcomes are, in theory, able to mitigate them and help
others do so as well. Slovic and Sunstein provide opportunities to
consider how those efforts by any level of public official can be successful
and integrated into organizational and institutional norms.
Slovic's first two recommendations-insulate institutions from the
behavioral failure and remove or restrict institutional features that
foster those
conditions-anticipate
that public officials
can
independently or collaboratively identify the relevant failures shaping
their actions. A workforce educated on these issues or trained to identify
them in specific settings may do this with little direction or guidance.
More likely, however, an organization must assess its decision processes
to form an evolving understanding of behavioral failures affecting
policy. Armed with such knowledge the organization can consider
default rules, precommitment devices, or other design features
recommended to mitigate the concerns. 73
National security officials may be more likely than other public
officials to experience certain failures given the constant stream of
threat information they see, day-to-day concerns about preventing
attacks, and a wide variety of professional and political post-attack
concerns. Insulating individual agencies from such failures at numerous
policy development levels is a significant undertaking. Accomplishing
that task in multiagency decision-making environments like those
involving the NSC, OLC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff adds an additional level
of complexity.
Common approaches may be found in mitigating behavioral failures
in similar ways. To counter loss aversion, for example, prospect theory
encourages shifting officials' reference points away from near-term
losses, distancing decision makers from recent events, and identifying
long-term welfare outcomes that are more beneficial than near-term
interests. The theory is a design tool that helps organizations both
articulate welfare outcomes related to a body of transnational law and
identify decision points when those outcomes are pursued or rejected. 74
Senior officials must harmonize many views to do this effectively within
any one federal agency. Accomplishing that task across agencies and
with the White House presents additional challenges, not least because
individual, organizational, and institutional interests can vary

73. See Slovic et al., supra note 6, at 134-135.
74. See, e.g., Weber, supranote 60, at 384.
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considerably among civil servants, elected officials, and political
appointees.
Scaling the task back to System 1 and System 2 reference points
along the lines Slovic recommends may help bound these efforts
considerably. His recommendation to directly promote System 2
deliberation might be applied by establishing policies that all critical
decisions be made through deliberative System 2 processes rather than
informal System 1 consultations. His recommendation to employ System
1 to channel actors to System 2 processes is perhaps more challenging to
envision.
Slovic's example for officials deciding whether to use armed force to
stop mass atrocities is to present them with affective imagery so their
System 1 judgments bring future welfare interests into direct
discussion. In this scenario, a rich body of transnational law regulates
the use of force, the treatment of combatants and noncombatants, and
the protection of civilians. Images of physical destruction and victims of
atrocities bring these welfare interests directly into the policy debate so
the law's forward-looking moral objectives can be debated as much as its
present-day formal requirements. As with the transnational law of
torture, one broad category of interests in this area is humane
treatment by public officials.
Sunstein's arguments for cost-benefit analysis give further shape to
organizational and institutional steps that help officials achieve optimal
welfare outcomes. Converting nonmonetary values to dollar equivalents
is among the more challenging of his recommendations. On first
consideration it may seem repugnant to attempt to value (let alone
compare) lives that may be saved in a future terrorist attack or harmed
through the use of torture when officials contemplate interrogation
policies. However, statistical value of life calculations are an essential
element of health and safety regulatory programs like airline passenger
screening, and they are already common in counterterrorism security
programs. As a complement to other System 2 steps by which officials
attempt to state the full range of a policy's benefits, such steps are no
doubt as valuable for evaluating operational programs as they are for
evaluating regulatory programs.
The second significant contribution from Sunstein's list is the role
that law can play. In the same way that he views federal law as a check
on valuations of life in administrative regulatory programs, federal law
can also check the executive branch's valuations as used in
counterterrorism programs and policy debates. Norms that evolve even
informally between the legislative and executive branches often become
part of executive decision-making processes. This kind of multibranch
engagement could thus prove helpful as agencies and White House
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officials attempt to create System 2 processes using common reference
points.

B. Improving U.S. National Security Decisions
Two focal points of behavioral public choice theory are the definition
and assessment of welfare outcomes and the effect of behavioral failures
on achieving those outcomes. As described in Part II, welfare outcomes
in transnational security fields are not identified as rigorously as they
often are in administrative regulatory fields, and behavioral failures are
endemic to all human decision making. This creates the presumption
that behavioral failures and corresponding welfare shortfalls can be
found in all transnational security policies. While the specific failures
that shaped past policy decisions may be difficult to discern with
certainty, historical events can help identify areas for immediate
improvement or further study. The following discussion draws upon the
formation of the 2002-2003 policies to consider opportunities for lawyers
to contribute to improved welfare outcomes under transnational law.
1. CIA Decision Processes
Attorneys may be an agency's first source of expertise on relevant
law, but a legal department is an incomplete resource for such
undertakings. Security crises, policy interests of newly elected
executives, and other circumstances may bring new bodies of law into
consideration that exceed the office's expertise. Attorneys may also feel
that they are not permitted or incentivized to raise moral considerations
or other policy factors in decision-making processes. Rule 2.1 of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct makes
it clear that attorneys may do so:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only
to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be
75
relevant to the client's situation.

75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
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But whether and how an attorney takes this step depends heavily on
personal relationships, organizational processes, and institutional
norms. The more specific area of inquiry to improve CIA welfare
assessments is therefore how attorneys and other professionals
collectively reach organizational decisions regarding transnational law.
Upon first hearing of the new interrogation program, General
Counsel Rizzo walked the CIA campus alone to contemplate the gravity
of the legal, moral, and other aspects of the interrogation methods the
counterterrorism division proposed for Abu Zubaydah. His System 1
response nearly led him to disapprove the proposal without further
analysis or broader debate:
I was confident that I could squelch at least the more
interrogation
[enhanced
proposed
aggressive
techniques], then and there, if I wanted to. Besides
being the Agency's chief legal officer, I had the
experience, credibility, and influence to have made that
call, and to have made it stick with the [Deputy Director
of Operations], Jim Pavett, and George Tenet... . I have
no doubt that if I had said the word, much if not all of
the [enhanced interrogation technique] initiative would
have quietly died before it was born. It would have been
a relatively easy thing to do, actually.76
He decided it was not his policy decision to make; therefore, he began an
organizational System 2 process that included the CIA director and, at
Rizzo's encouragement, the Justice Department and the White House.
In some respects Rizzo's actions are in line with Slovic's framework.
His System 1 judgments channeled him first to a multiday System 2
deliberative process then to a more formal System 2 process with other
senior CIA officials.7 7 The opportunity to raise such issues with other
agencies and the president through established procedures of the NSC
and OLC directly promotes System 2 deliberation. But it is an open
public choice question whether those mechanisms helped the CIA
director identify relevant welfare interests to reach an optimal outcome.
It is equally plausible that Justice Department or White House officials
used those processes to advance personal, organizational, or
institutional interests by substituting their own, less robust, welfare
assessments for the CIA's.

76. Rizzo, supra note 33, at 186.
77. See id. at 187.
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A holistic view of the decision-making process is therefore required
to consider how Slovic's framework improves welfare outcomes in U.S.
transnational security decision making. It is, for example, insufficient to
insulate any one agency from behavioral failures if OLC or senior
decision makers in the NSC process will reintroduce them. Likewise,
officials must proactively remove or restrict institutional features that
foster behavioral failures in multiagency and interagency processes for
those processes to be most effective.
Acknowledging the need for systemic improvements outside an
agency does not, however, preclude agencies from applying Slovic's
framework in beneficial ways. Establishing a list of former senior
officials with security clearances for on-call consultations would promote
System 2 deliberation. So would an internal ethics panel charged with
formulating welfare assessments, advising senior officials, or consulting
with outside experts. The qualitative and quantitative aspects of this
work implement some of Sunstein's recommendations. Robust welfare
assessments might have the added benefit of minimizing influence from
other parts of government that propose policies with less optimal
welfare outcomes.
However agencies decide to improve welfare assessments on
transnational security interests, the underlying objective is to recognize
that each agency official is in a position to contribute as a behavioral
and moral agent. Officials have opportunities to add to or detract from
the welfare outcomes that result from the agency's legal and policy
decisions. Three key functions for attorneys in the intelligence
community are to begin the inquiry into moral, social, and other aspects
of applicable law; identify salient information for decision makers; and
prompt officials to study, improve, and use System 2 decision processes.
2. Defense DepartmentDecision Processes
Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to implement a new policy quickly in
late 2002 without consulting OLC, NSC, or other White House officials,
at least formally, contrasts sharply with the CIA's interest in securing
both a formal legal opinion about the bounds of lawful interrogations
and a separate commitment that the Justice Department would not
prosecute CIA employees for applying the proposed techniques.7 8 This
difference may reflect a different level of awareness of or commitment to
identifying and advancing employees' psychic, financial, career, and
other welfare interests in high-risk policy areas. More likely, however, is
the possibility that the rapid approval process followed from tacit
78. See id. at 192.
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understandings or informal coordination processes among the president,
vice president, and their senior political appointees at the White House
and the Defense Department.
Another critical focus area is the outsize role that midlevel
organizational experts can have in transnational security decisions. If
Colonel Beaver's memorandum was the predominant source of expertise
guiding Secretary Rumsfeld, General Counsel Haynes, and other senior
officials, then the failure of that memorandum to advise on moral and
other welfare interests as encouraged by Model Rule 2.1 poorly prepared
those officials for their respective decisions. The opportunity for
organizational expertise from career officials to shape consequential
human rights issues can be a hallmark of sound System 2 processes.
This process stands as a cautionary tale, however. A requirement for
written legal opinions to address moral and other dimensions of a body
of transnational security and human rights law would promote salience
of transnational law's welfare interests and improve attorney
implementation of Rule 2.1.
Navy General Counsel Mora's efforts to influence legal and policy
discussions warrant particular consideration because they give full
effect to Rule 2.1 and touch on many of Slovic and Susntein's
recommendations. It would have been prudent for Secretary Rumsfeld
or General Counsel Haynes to consult or inform senior Bush-Cheney
administration officials like Mora and the other appointed general
counsel of the military services, if only to ensure that they could respond
to inquiries arising from military service members involved in the
interrogations. Advancing the new policies without the expertise and
advice of those senior Defense Department attorneys points to
institutional, bureaucratic, personal, or political motivations of
Rumsfeld, Haynes, or White House officials. Deeper public choice
analysis to identify the motivations and methods of constraining System
2 processes this way may help legal and policy officials consider how
they can be most effective applying transnational law. At a minimum,
Mora's experience helps educate officials on the tenacity that may be
required to improve System 2 processes during a crisis.
3. Lawyers and Leadership
Attorneys play critical roles in transnational security decisions, and
the bounded rationality of the national security environment affects
them as much as other expert advisors and policy officials. 79 In planning
to mitigate behavioral failures, national security lawyers must be
79. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 61, at 39.
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prepared to see themselves as both legal service providers and
institutional leaders. These different roles call for different kinds of
preparation to enable them to fulfill public legal functions effectively.
Developing and providing subject matter expertise on the state of
the law is an essential element of the legal function. Developing
expertise and comfort advising on a body of law beyond its specific
mandates may be more challenging for attorneys. To many attorneys
and policy officials, input from lawyers on moral issues, the welfare
objectives of a statute or treaty, or historical trends in transnational
security and human rights fields intrude on the policy-making function.
But developing expertise and comfort in those areas is a vital
component of the attorney's professional ethical duties, including Rule
2.1. Government legal offices must therefore develop attorneys to help
them fulfill this obligation as a core component of the agency's basic
legal services.
Accomplishing that task is a leadership challenge for which senior
legal officials must prepare. They may have to overcome institutional
inertia and strong personalities to shape a vision for effective
relationships between policy officials and lawyers who serve as advisors
on moral, social, and other factors. Junior attorneys must be prepared to
identify those issues as readily as they identify rules of law. They must
also develop the interpersonal skills to form effective relationships with
the officials they serve. Collectively the attorneys in a government legal
office must also be prepared to study and understand the complex
boundedly rational environment in which they work. One dimension of
that undertaking is to explore the ways in which sound decisions on
policy and ethics are made by individuals they serve.8 0 A second is to
understand and mitigate the ways they themselves are prone to
behavioral failures, including ethical lapses that contribute to
suboptimal legal services and, as a result, suboptimal policy outcomes. 81
Of course, attorneys do not bear full responsibility for such
outcomes. It is both unwise and an abdication of one's own moral and
behavioral agency for an official to regard the attorney as the sole or
primary systemic moral check on policy interests or the implementation
of a body of transnational law. Lawyer leaders exercising moral courage
in the most ideal ways may be successful in those undertakings. 82 But

80. See Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior,
109 PROC. NATI'L ACAD. OF ScI. 4086 (2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/11/4086.full
(reporting that "upper-class individuals behave more unethically than lower-class
individuals.").
81. See Prentice, supra note 61, passim.
82. See JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES 306 (2007).
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society's rule-of-law interests in the sound implementation and
evolution of a field like transnational torture law require transnational
executives to improve accountability and leadership for all public
officials in their institutions and organizations.
The foundational academic scholarship to draw on in this
84
interdisciplinary area is scant. Deborah Rhode, 83 James Baker, Robert
85
86
Prentice, and others provide important insights on leadership, ethics,
and attorney education to guide future behavioral public choice studies
in transnational security fields. Combined with a trend in social science
to view leadership as a systemic property rather than an individual
attribute,8 7 such work presents the promise of developing specific
guidance for legal professionals to help apply and further develop
transnational law.
C. Improving InternationalLaw
Specific recommendations to improve treaties and the international
institutions and organizations that implement them should be reserved
until more rigorous review of the Bush-Cheney administration's global
detention-interrogation networks can be performed. New details about
those networks continue to come to light from U.S. government,88
media, and other inquiries. Based on the discussion points presented in
this Article it is nevertheless possible to point to education and
behavioral ethics as areas for international law and organizations to
look for improvements.
1. Educating TransnationalExecutives
Lawyers, psychologists, counterterrorism analysts, intelligence
officers, criminal investigators, military commanders, civilian policy

&
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officials, and others contributed to the CIA and Defense Department
torture decisions. Given the officials' very different experiences with
interrogation, they undoubtedly had different degrees of knowledge
about the Geneva Conventions, CAT, and the legal and moral norms of
the broader transnational torture regime. How U.S. officials dealt with
this information imbalance is an important area of inquiry, particularly
if there is an expectation that all public officials have equal knowledge
about the law. It is also useful to consider broadening education
programs under the CAT and Geneva Conventions to ensure that senior
policy officials-not just those involved in detention and interrogationare informed about the law of torture.
The U.S. decisions also provide an opportunity to consider how
education on legal and moral norms relates to the formation and
deliberation of dissenting policy views. Education on torture and other
acts pursuant to Article 10 would have been similar in the FBI and the
military services, and those agencies were the sources of clear, strong
dissent from career officials and political appointees alike. In contrast,
System 2 dissent within the CIA and White House appeared
comparatively weak and correlated with a lack of required education on
transnational torture law.
CAT Article 10 provides an opportunity to address both issues. If
senior officials did not receive information that is common in most
education programs there is a strong behavioral argument for creating a
requirement specific to senior officials, up to and including heads of
state. Slovic's framework suggests ways to do this, and nations seeking
opportunities to provide moral leadership on this issue may be inclined
to proactively insulate their institutions from behavioral failures.
Article 10 might also be supplemented with reporting obligations so the
U.N. Committee on Torture can review and advise on national
programs.
2. BehavioralEthics
While abstract moral norms are not enforceable through legal
processes in international or national law, they are intrinsic to the law's
faithful implementation. Professional codes for attorneys, doctors, and
other professionals provide opportunities to consider how those groups
will implement the law. If they are expected to improve welfare
outcomes, then international or national law can help achieve them by
establishing requirements for their implementation and enforcement.
International and national components of transnational law may
also improve welfare outcomes if they require decision-making bodies to
designate a moral agent to make those issues salient in decision
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processes. As noted above, attorneys may be able to fill that role, but
they are not necessarily the best choice. To be effective the agent's role
must be designed thoughtfully, in full recognition of pressures that may
arise during any crisis due to behavioral or public choice factors.
The general approach in these recommendations is to address the
behavioral nature of ethical decision making. Recognizing that context
affects ethical decisions as much as it shapes policy, legal, and other
judgments creates opportunities to improve the law well beyond its
prohibitions and judicial enforcement mechanisms. At the international
or national level executive and legislative officials can seek greater
understanding of those dynamics so law can be equally effective
promoting broader societal interests.
CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed that behavioral public choice theory
provides important analytical perspectives to inform the study of
transnational security decision making in national and international
forums. Such inquiry is a critical component of twenty-first century
rule-of-law analysis because complex global relationships defined in
public law are increasingly central to the efficient and effective conduct
of security strategies and human rights initiatives. Whether those
strategies are intended to thwart nation-state or other threat actors,
economic and behavioral perspectives can reveal strengths and frailties
in efforts to design, implement, and evolve transnational law as a source
of both legal and moral norms.
The U.S. experience reconsidering national-level torture policy in
the Bush-Cheney administration suggests that welfare interests
advanced by transnational torture law were poorly defined and
regarded in numerous U.S. national security communities. Behavioral
science provides many possible reasons for this. This Article proposes
that significant rule-of-law benefits can be identified by advancing
behavioral public choice analysis of transnational security and
humanitarian considerations, not just state-level security interests.
Formal studies of transnational security decision-making environments
and legal frameworks can produce a deeper understanding of the
bounded rationality of transnational security decision making. Such
knowledge can, in turn, lead to specific recommendations for
transnational executives in intergovernmental organizations like the
U.N., heads of state, senior political appointees, and in a wide variety of
career officials to account for behavioral failures. In concert with those
steps, the design of treaties, constitutions, and national laws and
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regulations must also be considered to maximize global welfare
interests.
The U.S.-led global response to Al Qaeda's 2001 attacks
demonstrates that the national executive power can greatly undermine
transnational public law constructs and multigenerational efforts to
advance the rule of law. The full harm of security programs like global
detention-interrogation programs or domestic internment camps can
never be fully calculated or remedied. This harm can only be foreseen
and avoided. As the international community confronts old and new
global security problems, executives have the opportunity to face them
with improved laws and decision frameworks that more perfectly
anticipate humanity's many cognitive and behavioral shortcomings.

